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LIFE OR DEATH? THE DEATH PENALTY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty is an extremely complex subject in many nations
around the world. Arguments on whether it is allowable under many
nations' laws have been occurring for some time now. Two countries,
South Africa and the United States, travelled interesting and divergent
paths when deciding if the death penalty was constitutional.
South Africa, previously one of the countries most adherent to the
penalty, has now abolished the death penalty under its new govern-
ment. The United States, on the other hand, has moved from imple-
menting the death penalty in almost every state, to finding the death
penalty laws of those states unconstitutional, to holding the death pen-
alty constitutional in those states that implemented new laws.
What happened in these two countries to cause such divergent
paths concerning the death penalty? This paper will discuss how the
paths were created and the future of the death penalty by comparing
the history of the law in South Africa and the United States.
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II. SOUTH AFRICA
A. A Gruesome Past
1. The History of the Death Penalty
The implementation of the death penalty began in South Africa
when the Dutch colonists settled in the Cape of South Africa during the
seventeenth century.' Roman-Dutch law governed the colonists. The
law provided that the punishment for murder and many other crimes
was death.' Along with the death penalty, torture was allowable until
1827 when the First Charter of Justice abolished all forms of torture.3
Roman-Dutch legal traditions, however, kept the death penalty as a
possible punishment. The First Charter of Justice, although it abolished
torture, allowed the government to apply the death penalty with one
stipulation: the convicted criminal must not be tortured before being
put to death.' During this period in history, the courts embraced the
death penalty, imposing it for hundreds of crimes.' South African
courts imposed the death penalty for rape, robbery, housebreaking with
aggravating circumstances, sabotage involving murder, terrorism,
kidnaping, child-stealing, and murder.6
The next turn in the path of the death penalty occurred with the
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917. The Act limited capital
punishment to three crimes: murder, treason, and rape.7 It seems
strange, though, that the number of crimes the South African Parlia-
ment allowed to be punished by the death penalty changed frequently.
The strong presence of apartheid and political issues were most likely
the cause.8 For example, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, intro-
duced during an "intensification of political oppression," provided for
eleven capital crimes.9
Political oppression has been a large part of South Africa's past.
The oppressed were the blacks of South Africa, and the death penalty
was one of the means of oppression. The black population argued that
1. George Devenish, The Historical and Jurisprudential Evolution and Background to the
Application of the Death Penalty in South Africa and Its Relationship with the Constitutional
Reform, 5 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5 (1992).
2. Id. at 5-6.
3. Id. at 7.
4. Id.
5. The "Bloody Code" was in effect in England during the 1700s. The Code made the
death penalty applicable to two hundred crimes. Van Niekerk, Hanged By the Neck Until You
Are Dead, 86 S. AFR. L.J. 457, 461 (1969).
6. Id. at 459. See also E. Kahn, The Death Penalty in South Africa, 33 J. CONTEMPT.
ROMAN/DUTCH L. 108, 117 (1970).
7. Devenish, supra note I, at 8. See also Kahn, supra note 6, at 139.
8. See generally Van Niekerk, supra note 5, at 457.
9. Devenish, supra note I, at 8-9.
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the death penalty was being used to control their race, and their race
alone. From 1947 to 1966, 288 whites were convicted of raping
blacks, yet none were sentenced to death.' ° In contrast, 844 blacks
were convicted of raping whites, resulting in 122 executions." The
abolitionist movement used this "race card" to try and defeat the death
penalty. Further, the abolitionist movement used the highly publicized
crimes of blacks raping whites as a tool. By writing stories and pub-
lishing statistics about the death penalty and race, the movement
showed that the death penalty was being used as a social and political
tool by whites in South Africa.
Conversely, the South African Parliament suggested that capital
punishment needed to be retained to protect policemen, 2 to adhere to
public support for the imposition of the death penalty, 3 and to create
a deterrent for crime.' 4 The penalty was a mandatory sentence of
death for many crimes, with no right for the convicted person to ap-
peal.
2. The Statistics of the Death Penalty
Although differing views existed in South Africa about why the
death penalty should or should not be maintained, the death penalty
was being applied to hundreds of cases. Sentencing people to death was
not an unusual occurrence in South African courts. From its unioniza-
tion in 1910, South Africa has imposed the death penalty more than
any other country.' 5 In fact, this country accounts for about forty-
seven percent of the executions that have occurred in the world.' 6 The
death penalty was applied to such an unusually large number of cases
in South Africa that the public was deemed "to be crimson with shame
and confusion. '"I
Most countries' execution rates fluctuate down during a period of
war, a national crisis, or a change in society such as industrialization.
South Africa on the other hand, throughout its national crisis of apart-
heid, continued to send its citizens to the gallows at a "normal" rate.'"
10. Id. at 23. See also Van Neikerk, supra note 5, at 18.
11. Devenish, supra note 1, at 23-24. "Out of 2,740 persons executed between 1910 and
1975, less than one hundred were white." Id. at 23.
12. Van Niekerk, supra note 5, at 472.
13. Id. at 473.
14. Id. at 474. See generally State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu (Const. Ct. Republic S.
Afr. 1995) (Internet, http://pc72.1aw.wits.ac.za/index.html); Kahn, supra note 6; Devenish,
supra note 1.
15. Van Niekerk, supra note 5, at 458.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 457.
18. Id. at 458. From 1911 to 1947, South Africa executed fewer than 25 people per year.
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In 1911, for example, fifty-seven people were hanged.' 9 The death
toll continued to rise when, in 1954, seventy-three people died from
being hanged at the gallows.2 Even though the figures from 1911-47
seem extraordinarily high, the death penalty rate still continued to
rise.2' Since 1948, the average number of convicted criminals to be
executed per year was 66.6.22 During the years of 1957-66, an aver-
age of 89.3 persons were hanged per year.23
With so many criminals being put to death, the abolitionist move-
ment in South Africa began to build steam in the 1970's. The forma-
tion of an organized movement against the death penalty dramatically
lowered the number of persons being executed. For example, in 1970-
73 a total number of 246 persons were executed. 24 However, the ef-
forts of the Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South
Africa, headed by B. Van Niekerk, soon lost their effectiveness.25 In
1987, 164 people in one city of South Africa were executed, "thirty-
two times more than China with its population of [two] billion. "26
The trend in the number of persons being executed changed again
beginning in 1988. After a campaign to save a highly-publicized group
of accused criminals known as the "Sharpville Six", international and
domestic pressure to abolish the death penalty in South Africa lowered
the actual number of people put to death7 In 1988, the death toll was
117, and in 1989, the number executed decreased significantly to fifty-
three. Even though fifty-three might seem low, South Africa was still
executing in numbers that were relatively large to the size of the coun-
try.29
With the death penalty in force and large numbers of South Afri-
During one of the most detrimental economic crisis of South African history, the penalty rate
stayed at 14.4 deaths per year. Id.
19. Id.
20. Van Niekerk, supra note 5, at 458.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Two thousand, one hundred and seven persons were put to death by hangings in
South African gallows from 1911-66. Id. It is interesting to note that the author, Van Niekerk,
was prosecuted for contempt of court after the publication of his article in the South African
Law Journal. Devenish, supra note 1, at 11.
24. Van Neikerk, supra note 5, at 458.
25. Devenish, supra note i, at 11. Van Niekerk died at the age of 42. The Society he cre-
ated suffered without his presence. Id.
26. Id. at 12.
27. Id. at 13. The "Sharpville Six" were six men sentenced to death for being named as
the killers of Sharpville Counselor Khuzwayne Dlamini. "Domestic and international pressure
against the death penalty in South Africa reached unprecedented climaxes during 1989," ac-
cording to Devenish. Organizations, like the Lawyer for Human Rights (LHR), were being
formed to call for a moratorium on eleven executions in South Africa during this period. Id.
28. South Africa's population in 1992 was 27 million people. Id.
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can blacks being sentenced to death, pressure was put on the govern-
ment to establish some guidelines for the death penalty. On February
2, 1990, President F.W. De Klerk announced a moratorium for the
death penalty. 9 In his speech, the President called for the reform of
the death penalty by stating that it should be imposed only in extreme
cases, by broadening the judicial imposition of the penalty, and by
establishing an appeal process.30
In response to President De Klerk speech, Parliament enacted the
Criminal Law Amendment Act. The Act provided for the death penalty
for six crimes, one of the six being murder.3 As a result of the mora-
torium, the last execution in South Africa was the hanging of S.
Ngobeni on November 14, 1989.32
In order to smooth over political unrest, could the citizens of
South Africa see the abolition of the death penalty in their future?
Devenish, the author of The Evolution, stated, "The abolition of the
death penalty in South Africa would contribute to the process of politi-
cal reconciliation since many blacks view the excessive use of the death
penalty in South Africa as a tool of oppression by a minority racist re-
29. State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Const. Ct. Republic S. Afr. 1995), at *n.192
(Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html). The moratorium applied to 304 people on
death row at that time. Id. The announcement did not stop the imposition of the penalty,
though. People were still sentenced to death after the moratorium was in place. Id.
30. Id.
31. Devenish, supra note 1, at 27. The Act made the death moratorium mandatory and
gave the convicted a right to an appeal. Makwanyane & Mchunu at *n.193 (Internet,
http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html). Section 277(1)(a) provides:
Sentence of Death
(I) The sentence of death may be passed by a superior court only and only in the
case of a conviction for-
(a) murder;
(b) treason committed when the Republic is in a state of war;





(2) The sentence of death shall be imposed-
(a) after the presiding judge conjointly with the assessors (if any), .... or, in
the case of a trial by a special superior court, that court, with due regard to
any evidence and argument on the sentence . . . , has made a finding on the
presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating factors; and
(b) if the presiding judge or court. . . with due regard to that finding, is
satisfied that the sentence of death is the proper sentence. ...
Id.
32. See, Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, Inaugural Address of the Constitutional Court
(Feb. 14, 1995), available in Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.htm [hereinafter Inau-
gural Address].
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gime."33 Many people began to predict a change in South Africa re-
garding apartheid and the justice system. After the moratorium was
announced, Nelson Mandela, a prominent black leader, was released
from prison, and a new system of justice in South Africa, as Devenish
predicted, would soon be formed.
B. Today in South Africa: Makwanyane and Mchunu
1. A New Constitution
The new governing constitution was established prior to South
Africa's first democratic elections in April, 1994.14 The constitution
was formed through negotiations conducted by the Multi-Party Negotia-
tion Process.35 Technical committees advised negotiators through doc-
umented reports.36 However, it is only an "interim" constitution be-
cause it has not yet been adopted by a "democratically elected"
body.37
The constitution must be implemented by the Constitutional As-
sembly - that is, the old Parliament. The Assembly, if it has any ques-
tions regarding a proposed portion of the new constitution, can submit
the portion to the court for its opinion.38 The Assembly differs from
South Africa's old government, a parliamentary system, because now a
court and constitution will also govern along with the Assembly.39
Even though it has yet to be ratified, the people of South Africa
are very proud of their new constitution. As stated in the inaugural ad-
dress for the installation of the new court, "[The Constitution] belongs
to the people and it was the people who, together, gave it shape and
life."40 It was established that the constitution "shall be the supreme
law of the Republic . . 4 Although the constitution is still being
amended, South Africa is ready to govern itself through a democratic
process.
The constitution contains many provisions and a Bill of Rights that
relate to the death penalty issue. Chapter Three of the constitution lays
out the fundamental rights of South African citizens, along with how
the courts are to interpret those rights. Section 11(2) prohibits "cruel,
33. Devenish, supra note 1, at 27.




38. State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Const. Ct. Republic S. Afr. 1995) (Internet,
http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.htm1). There must be one-fifth of the members that want to
send the proposal to the Court. Id. See also Inaugural Address, supra note 32.
39. Makwanyane & Mchunu, (Internet, http://pc72.1aw.wits.ac.za/index.html).
40. Inaugural Address, supra note 32.
41. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. CONST. § 4(1).
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 4 Section 8 states
that "every person shall have the right to equality before the law and
equal protection of the law."43 Section 9 says that "every person
should have the right to life."" Along the same lines, section 10
states that "every person shall have the right to respect for and protec-
tion of his or her dignity." '45 Also, the constitution provides through
section 33(1):
The right in this chapter may be limited by law of general application, pro-
vided that such limitation (a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is
(i) reasonable; (ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
freedom and equality; and (b) shall not negate the content of the essential
right in question.'
Section 33(1)(b) also provides that the limitation of certain rights
"shall, in addition to being reasonable ...also be necessary. ""4 Each
of the sections mentioned were important to the Constitutional Court in
the interpretation of whether the death penalty should be used in South
Africa.
2. A New Court
Along with the constitution and the Parliament, a new court was
created. With the words of their new leader, President Nelson
Mandela, who stated "[t]he last time I was in court was to hear wheth-
er or not I was going to be sentenced to death," the new judges of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa were inaugurated." The court
consists of eleven members, nine men and two women, each serving a
term of seven years.49 The judges' installation was "another milestone
on [South Africa's] difficult journey toward democracy and a culture of
human rights."' With the creation of the court, South Africa will
42. Id. § 11(2).
43. Id. § 8.
44. Id. § 9.
45. Id. § 10.
46. Id. § 33(l).
47. Id.
48. Paul Taylor, Mandela Swears in First Constitutional Court; By Creating a System of
Checks and Balances, South Africa Joins World's Democracies, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1995,
at A13.
49. Welcome to South Africa's First Constitutional Court, available in Internet,
http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html [hereinafter Welcome]. The number of judges could
change if there is an amendment by the Constitutional Assembly between now and the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution. Id. The Judges of the Constitutional Court are: The President Arthur
Chaskalson, Ismail Mohomed, Sydney Kentridge standing in for Richard Goldstone, Laurence
Ackerman, Tole Madala, John Didcott, Johann Kriegler, Kate O'Regan, Yvonne Mokgoro,
and Puis Langa. Id.
50. Taylor, supra note 48, at A13.
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now have a system of checks and balances like those of other democra-
cies of the world.51
How does a case reach the new court? First, the case must go to
the Supreme Court, which can refer the case to the Constitutional
Court or decide the case itself. 2 If the judges on the Supreme Court
think that a case involves interpretation of the constitution, they send
the case to the new Constitutional Court, putting their decision on
hold. 3 Second, an appeal can be lodged with the Constitutional Court.
If the Constitutional Court decides that the question posed relates to an
interpretation of the constitution, it will hear the case.54 These cases
are not heard automatically." The role of the Constitutional Court, as
the judges were told during their inauguration, is "to act as guardian
and protector of the Constitution. . .guided by wisdom and a deep
respect for human rights, and, in particular, the dignity of every wom-
an and man in our country, "56
The court is an important part of the new South Africa. It has the
authority to overrule the Parliament when laws are established that the
court interprets as violating the constitution.57 The court can also
"check" the disputes of the Parliament. 8 If a dispute arises that ques-
tions whether any proposed legislation is constitutional, the members of
Parliament may petition the Constitutional Court. 9
How do the court proceedings work? The court is open to the
public and the press, although no cameras or recorders are permit-
ted.' The court decides whether the issue(s) involved in the case re-
late to the constitution and if they do, whether they fall within the
constitution's parameters. 61 The court does not hear evidence or ques-
tion any witnesses, and it does not decide whether someone is guilty or
deserves damages.62
The court has an important role to play in the evolution of the
democratic society in South Africa. The judges must view their roles as






56. Inaugural Address, supra note 32.
57. South Africa High Court Sworn, MORNING EDITION, Feb. 14, 1995, transcript avail-
able in WESTLAW, AFRNEWS Database.
58. Welcome, supra note 49.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court is in session as follows: February 15th to March 31st, May 1st to May





Omar, Minister of Justice, reminded them, "[T]he eyes of the people
of South Africa - and indeed the world - are upon you. We wish you
success." 63 The eyes of the South African inmates and the abolitionists
around the world were definitely watching when the court decided its
first case - the constitutionality of the death penalty.
C. The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu: The End of the Death
Penalty for South Africa
1. The Facts
Two black males, T. Makwanyane and M. Mchunu, robbed a bank
security vehicle that was delivering monthly wages to a hospital in
Johannesburg. The men were part of a robbery "ring" that planned
robberies. Armed with assault rifles, the men opened fire on a security
vehicle and the vehicle's police escort. As a result of the shooting, two
policemen and two bank security officers were killed.'
The men accused were tried and convicted in the Witwatersrand
Local Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa.65 They were
found guilty of four counts of murder, one count of attempted murder,
and one count of robbery with aggravating circumstances.' The ac-
cused were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for the attempted
murder and robbery charges, and were sentenced to death for the
murders.67 An appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
ensued. The court dismissed the appeals on the attempted murder
charge and the robbery charge.68 The appellate division decided that
for the four murder charges, the accused should receive the heaviest
penalty available under the law. However, the new constitution was
implemented during the review of this case, so the appellate division
postponed its hearing on the murder charges until the constitutional
issues could be decided by the Constitutional Court.69
On February 15, 1995, the Constitutional Court began hearing the
case. The issues presented by the defendants were: (1) "the constitu-
tionality of section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act," and (2)
"the implications of section 241(8) of the Constitution. ,,7o The court
decided that, since the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the
trial level because the constitution was not yet in force, counsel for
63. Inaugural Address, supra note 32.






69. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html).
70. See id. for the text of § 277.
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The court decided unanimously that the death penalty was uncon-
stitutional. The President of the court wrote the main opinion, with
each of the other nine judges writing concurring opinions. The court
used many resources to reach its conclusion. It used the sections of the
constitution mentioned earlier to evaluate the constitutionality of the
death penalty.72 In analyzing the sections of the constitution, the court
looked to parliamentary material to aid in the interpretation of ambigu-
ous or obscure terms.73 The court, under the guidance of section 35(1)
of the constitution, also "regarded" foreign law in its attempt to under-
stand the international aspect of the death penalty .7' The laws and the
interpretation of those laws came from many international sources
including the United States,75 Germany,76 Canada,77 the United Na-
tions, 7 the European Convention on Human Rights,79 India,8" and
the Republic of Hungary. 8
In using the resources mentioned, the court first examined whether
or not the death penalty violated the right to equal protection under the
law. The court found that disparity was involved in the application of
the death penalty because The Criminal Procedure Act, which allowed
for the death penalty, was in force for the "Old Republic of South
Africa."82 The other "states" of South Africa had either repealed the
death penalty all together or developed different criteria for its imposi-
tion.8"
Under section 229 of the constitution, all of the laws in force in
any area of the national territory, immediately before the commence-
ment of the constitution, were to continue to be in force, subject to
repeal or amendment.84 Therefore, The Criminal Procedure Act ap-
plied only to the "Old Republic of South Africa," and none of the
71. Id.
72. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. CONST. § I (B)(2).














other "states." Now that one new national territory existed, the rules
needed to be the same.
The defendants argued that the disparity in sentencing violated
their rights to "equal protection under the law."85 The court agreed. It
stated that the constitution was formed to bring the country together,
and under section 229 of the constitution, it can rule that section 277
caused disparity in the sentencing structure of South Africa.86 The
court then mentioned that disparity is only one of the factors it used to
find that the death penalty was unconstitutional.8 7
Another factor the court examined was whether or not the death
penalty was arbitrarily applied. The court believed each stage of the
death penalty process was an element of chance.88 Whether or not a
criminal is put to death was dependant upon an investigation by the
police, the presentation of the prosecution at trial, the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of defense counsel, the personality of the trial and
appellate judge regarding the death penalty, and the race and economic
status of the criminal."8 The court contends that mistakes are too easi-
ly made in such a system. The court repeatedly referred to how im-
prisonment was the better alternative in case a mistake was made. The
President of the court stated that "unjust imprisonment is a great
wrong, but if it is discovered, the prisoner can be released ...but the
killing of an innocent person is irremediable."'
After deciding that the death penalty denied citizens equality under
the law, the court developed a "two-stage" test to determine whether
the law violated rights under chapter three of the constitution. The first
stage of the test was to determine if there is disparity between the
crime and the penalty.9" In evaluating whether or not disparity exists,
a broad versus a narrow approach was given to the fundamental rights
laid out in chapter three of the constitution. 2 In deciding whether
proportionality existed between the two, the court cited factors such as




88. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html).
89. Id.
90. Id. Under the line of reasoning that the system creates mistakes, is it not true that for
any punishment mistakes can be made? Although death of the criminal is irrevocable, is the
death of the victim also not irrevocable? In many cases, the system itself can be monitored to
stop innocent persons from being condemned. The situation in South Africa differs from other
countries in that the judge decides the implication of the death penalty, and until recently, an
appeal process did not exist. Without even trying to remedy the system, the Court just abol-
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circumstances where neither arbitrariness nor error exist between the
accused and other persons facing similar charges, race, poverty, and
ignorance. "93
The factors mentioned above are not to be considered alone. Stage
two demands that a court consider the limitation clause in the constitu-
tion under section 33. The limitation clause provides that the rights
outlined in chapter three of the constitution can be limited only if the
limitation is "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality."94 Therefore, the decision of
the State to execute someone must be justifiable under section 33.
The first "right" in chapter three that the court tested was the right
not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under section
11(2). The State failed to prove, even under a broad interpretation, that
the death penalty is proportional to the crime of murder. Under section
11(2) of the constitution, the court held that the death penalty was
degrading because it stripped "the convicted person of all dignity" and
treated "him or her as an object to be eliminated by the state." 95 The
death penalty is "final and irrevocable," making it an "undoubtedly
cruel punishment." It was also held to be inhuman because it denied
criminals their humanity. 96
The court, after examining section 11(2), looked at section 9, the
right to life. The main opinion of the court did not spend time analyz-
ing the death penalty and how it violated section 9 under section 33.97
The court found that the section was straight forward-the right to life
was guaranteed to every person. An individual's right to life in South
Africa is the "most fundamental of all human rights."98
However, under the second stage of the test, the court looked to
whether or not the State had a reason to limit the right to life under
section 33. The stage involved balancing: (1) the limitation of the
nature of the right; (2) the importance of the right in a democratic and
free society; (3) the purpose of the limitation and the importance of
that limitation; and (4) the "extent of the limitation" particularly look-
ing at whether the ends could be reached in another, comparable, less
damaging means."
In its case to prove that the State had a reason to limit the right to
life, the State argued first that the death penalty is a necessary deter-




97. Many of the concurring opinions spoke about the extent to which the death penalty vio-
lated § 9.
98. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html).
99. Id.
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rent for the "preservation and protection of society . . . [w]ithout law,
society cannot exist, [w]ithout law, individuals in society have no
rights." " It argued that if the law is too lenient, then the people of
South Africa would begin to take the law into their own hands.'' The
Attorney General, in his argument stated that "[t]he level of violent
crime in our country has reached alarming proportions."0 2
The court did not agree. It stated that the reason crime was at an
all time high was because of the social changes going on in the coun-
try, including the political turmoil from 1990-94.'° In addition, pov-
erty and homelessness were on the rise. Last, the court stated that there
will always be "unstable, desperate, and pathological" people in soci-
ety.104 The court stated that the way to combat crime was to impose a
penalty as a deterrent and although the death penalty and imprisonment
are both deterrents, imprisonment was the one more favored by the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Judge Mahomed, in his concurring opinion, argued against the Attorney General's
statement that the death penalty is a deterrent for murderers. Id. (Mahomed, J., concurring).
He stated that "[s]uccessful deterrence of crime also involves the need for substantial redress in
the socio-economical conditions of those ravaged by poverty, debilitated by disease and malnu-
trition and disempowered by illiteracy." Id. The statement by the Judge was very broad, and,
is on its face, very believable. However, the changes the Judge proposed are what every soci-
ety in the world hopes for in their country. Is this a legitimate goal, especially for a country
that is still feeling the currents of the apartheid?
Judge Mohomad does continue, though, by saying that, "[c]rime is a multi-faceted phe-
nomenon. It has to be assaulted on a multi-dimensional level to facilitate effective deterrence."
Id. Dealing with crime is very complex. It involves the creation and use of police departments,
the government, lawyers, prosecutors, criminal courts and the court staff and judges, jails,
legislation. Crime also invokes fear in society, and involves victims and their feelings or their
loved ones feelings. This list is not all-inclusive. Does the death penalty not act as a deterrent
to anyone who thinks about committing a crime?
Judge Madala, in his concurring opinion, also commented on how to combat having to
use the death penalty. He called to his country by saying, "[wie must stand tallest in these
troubled times and realize that every accused person who is sent to jail is not beyond being
rehabilited-properly counselled- or, at the very least, beyond losing the will and capacity to do
evil." Id. He cites to the post-amble of the constitution, which is mentioned by each judge,
which uses the concept of ubuntu. Id. Judge Mokgoro defined the concept generally as "hu-
maneness," and fundamentally as "personhood" and "morality." Id. The post-amble of the
constitution calls for the need of ubuntu instead of the need for victimization. Id. Can a crimi-
nal who has murdered many times be counselled into "goodness" and stopped from committing
another brutal murder?
Cases throughout the United States have proven that many criminals, once released on
parole, will commit another crime. Is it possible for a person who is inherently evil to con-
form? Again, many societies wish this concept to be true. Yes, it is a goal to strive towards
making a better society, but is it literally possible? Do citizens want to risk their lives and the
lives of their loved ones on the belief that a violent criminal has been rehabilited into an angel?
103. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html).
104. Id.
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court. '05
The State then argued that the death penalty meets society's need
for adequate retribution for heinous offenses." 6 Again, the court dis-
agreed. It found that South Africans had outgrown the concept of "an
eye for an eye" by stating that the "State does not need to engage in
the cold and calculated killing of murderers in order to express moral
outrage at their conduct."'0 7 The conclusion drawn by the court was
that the State can send criminals to prison instead of to their deaths.
The State's next argument was that the death penalty was regarded
as an acceptable punishment in South Africa. The court objected saying
that the question before it was whether the constitution allows the
sentence, not whether the public likes the sentence.'0 8 While holding
that the opinion of the public was important, the court decided that if
public opinion was to govern, then there would be no need for "consti-
tutional adjudication. ""0
After the second stage of the test was completed, the court applied
a balancing test to consider the section 33(l)(b) requirement that a
limitation on any right cannot negate "an essential content of the
right. ""' The court acknowledged that the meaning of the phrase "an
essential content of the right" was difficult to decipher."' The court
had to examine the phrase through subjective and objective eyes. 112
Viewed subjectively, if "the essential content of the right not to be
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment . . . is found to
be respect for life and dignity . . . ," then the death penalty clearly
fails." 3 If viewed objectively, through a "constitutional norm" that
requires life and dignity to be respected, the penalty does not meet the
test.' The court pointed out that although the argument exists that
the death penalty protects the dignity and right to life of innocent pub-
lic persons, this argument includes a deterrent factor or retribution
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Another argument presented to the court by the Attorney General was that the
death penalty should be used for prevention. Once the criminal is executed, he or she can no
longer commit another murder. The court did not follow the reasoning of the Attorney Gener-
al, stating that imprisonment is also a way to prevent criminals from committing crimes. Id.
Hopefully, South Africa has enough jails to permanently house all of those convicted to life
imprisonment.




112. The court did not interpret the meaning of the section, since it believes that under the
"guise of the limitation" rights should not be taken away, period. Id.




factor with which the court did not agree. 15 The court instead balanc-
es the deterrence, prevention, and retribution factors against the possi-
bility of an alternative punishment and the factors that make the death
penalty cruel, inhuman, and degrading." 6 The State argued that crim-
inals forfeit their rights under the constitution when they commit mur-
der. The court disagreed, citing that in certain instances killing another
should be condoned."
7
In concluding their opinion, the judges decided that the death
penalty was unconstitutional."8 They ordered the State not to execute
any citizen in the future or any criminal already convicted. The crimi-
nals that were sentenced to die would have their sentences revoked and
replaced by another proper sentence."'
III. THE UNITED STATES
A. The History of the Death Penalty in the United States
1. How the Death Penalty is Applied, the Methods, and the
Statistics
The United States has put many criminals to death because several
states allow the death penalty. In the 1920s more than 1,000 persons
were executed.' 20 The 1930's can be remembered as the "heyday" for
the death penalty in America, with 199 persons being executed in
1935. 2' However, in the 1960's, executions became rare, and by
1967, executions ceased pending the resolutions of the challenges
against the penalty in front of the United States Supreme Court. 22 In-
terestingly enough, most of the executions from 1900 to 1976 took
place in the Southern states, leaving many wondering about the racial
aspect of the death penalty. 21
How did the death penalty begin in America? The colonists from
England brought the laws of their country to the new world. In the
fifteenth century, English law recognized eight crimes that could result
115. Id.
116. Id. The factors the court cites that make the death penalty cruel, inhuman, and degrad-
ing are: (1) the destruction of life; (2) the loss of a person's dignity; (3) the arbitrary way in
which the penalty is applied; and (4) the inequality of the penalty. Id.
117. Id. The Court acknowledged killing for self-defense, in wartime, and in police emer-
gencies. Id.
118. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.htm).
119. Id.
120. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE DEATH PENALTY 1, 9
(1987).
121. Id. For a chart on executions from 1930 to 1986, see id. at 207.
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. at 10. For example, two-thirds of the offenders executed in 1930 to 1967 were
black. Id. However, the number of whites executed from 1976 to 1986 were 67, whereas only
19 were black. Id. at 195.
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in the death penalty: treason, murder, petty treason (a wife killing her
husband), larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, and arson.'24 By 1688,
fifty crimes were added to the list of those crimes that were punishable
by the death penalty.' 25 In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
century, the "Bloody Code" was in effect, which added sixty more
crimes to the list.
26
More recently, the death penalty has been imposed only for mur-
der with aggravating circumstances in some states. The most common
circumstances when the death penalty is applied are those crimes: that
are defined as heinous, atrocious, and cruel; that involve multiple vic-
tims; that are committed during the commission of a felony; that are
committed for pecuniary gain; that involve a victim that was a police
officer; those where the offender was a prior violent offender; or
where the offender caused another to commit a murder.'27 The Su-
preme Court held that for aggravating circumstance to be valid, they
must not apply to every person convicted of murder, but only to a
"subclass of defendants." '28 Also, as the circumstances are defined by
statute, they cannot be unconstitutionally vague.'29
In addition to analyzing the circumstances behind a crime, the
Supreme Court also began to narrow the number of crimes to which a
state could apply the death penalty. In 1977, the Supreme Court ruled
that the death penalty was "grossly unproportionate" to the crime of
non-homicidal rape. 130 In the same year, the Court decided that the
crime of non-homicidal kidnapping should not draw the death penalty
because it would be "cruel and unusual."'' In 1982, the Court ruled
in Enmund v. Florida, that the death penalty being imposed on accom-
plices to a felony-murder was unlawful. 3 2 The Supreme Court also
decided that a person who becomes insane while awaiting execution
cannot be put to death.'33 However, the Court then ruled that a mild-
124. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 1, 6 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at 19. Some states, as of 1987, still im-
pose the death penalty for crimes other than homicide. For example, Mississippi still imposes
the death penalty for felonious child abuse (rape of a female child under the age of twelve). Id.
128. Tuilaepa v. California, - U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 2630 (1994); see also Kevin Sullivan &
Gaela Gehring, Project: Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO. L.J. 1281, 1288 (1995).
129. Id. at 1288.
130. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 585 (1977). The decision was a plurality opinion by the
Court. See also Sullivan & Gehring, supra note 128, at 1282.
131. Eberhart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977). The decision was written in a summa-
ry opinion. See also Sullivan & Gehring, supra note 128, at 1282.
132. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The decision was five votes to four.
133. Ford. v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). See also Sullivan & Gehring, supra note
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ly retarded person did not lack the capacity to understand the imposi-
tion of the death penalty and could be sentenced to death.'
Even though the American public has agreed to narrow the use of
the death penalty to certain crimes with certain circumstances, they
have always been fascinated with the death penalty. Executions were
viewed by the public in America "well into the nineteenth centu-
ry. "35 New York was the first to outlaw the public from viewing its
executions in 1835.136 A century passed before the rest of the states
followed suit. The last public execution in the United States was on
May 21, 1937.' 3
Most executions today are conducted with few witnesses. The
wardens of the prison systems do not allow pictures to be taken or
cameras to be in the execution chambers while the prisoner is being
executed. The decision that cameras were not allowed was first chal-
lenged in Garrett v. Estelle in 1977.138 In that case, a Dallas news-
man argued that the city's public television had a right to cover the
execution since the print media were allowed to cover the executions.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision by
ruling that the First and Fourteenth Amendment did not require Texas
to permit the admission of television cameras. 139
Along with the publicity surrounding the death penalty, the method
of execution was also changed. In the eighteenth century, "American
criminals were occasionally pressed to death, drawn and quartered, and
burned at the stake."'' The states changed the way they put criminals
to death beginning with New York, which was the first to take down
its gallows and construct an electric chair in 1888.41 Next, in 1921,
Nevada enacted a "Humane Death Bill" to provide that while asleep in
his or her cell, a criminal would be subjected to a dose of lethal
gas. 42 Gas chambers were soon installed in six other states. In 1977,
Utah used firing squads to execute prisoners.' 43 Oklahoma was the
first state to use lethal injection, in May of 1977.'" Today most of
128, at 1283.
134. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
135. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 124, at 12.
136. Id. at 13.
137. Id. Five hundred persons watched Mr. Jackson die. Admission was charged for those
who wanted to stand in a forty-foot square around the gallows. Id. Many of the spectators took
home a piece of the rope for a "souvenir." Id.
138. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
139. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 124, at 14.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id. at 16.
143. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra 124, at 17.
144. Id.
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the states that still use the death penalty as a method of execution use
lethal injection, the electric chair, or the gas chamber.'45 However, as
of October 1, 1986, four states still used hanging,"46 and thirty-seven
states still impose the death penalty.'47
2. The Process of Receiving the Death Penalty
The United States has a very complex system of checks and bal-
ances regarding the imposition of the death penalty. Although a meticu-
lous system of ensuring that a person should be put to death is needed,
it is very costly. Most states give the criminal the right of automatic
appeal to the highest court in the state after imposing the death penalty.
In the automatic appeal, the defendant may contest the conviction or
sentence on legal or constitutional grounds that may have arisen during
the trial." 8 However, the appeal is limited to the trial record, and
what the court actually reviews varies by state.
If the state supreme court upholds the sentence, then the defendant
can petition the U.S. Supreme Court. The defendant submits what is
known as a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court either hears or
denies. The only cases the court agrees to hear are those that involve a
substantial constitutional issue. 149
After a state court has upheld a criminal's sentence, the defendant
may also lodge a writ of habeas corpus to the state and federal courts.
A habeas corpus review differs from the automatic appeal because the
court can look beyond the trial record to find any new evidence or
issues, including the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 State
appeals can be taken as far as the state supreme court. If the sentence
is still upheld, a petition can be sent to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Once a defendant has exhausted the state court reviews, he or she
can file a federal writ of habeas corpus. The federal claims differ from
the state claims because they must be limited to federal violations of
the United States Constitution. The petitions begin in the district
courts, go through the courts of appeals, and then reach the U.S. Su-
preme Court.' 5
145. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at 192-93.
146. Id. The states are Delaware, Montana, Washington, and New Hampshire.
147. Id. at 192-93.
148. id. at 24.
149. Id.
150. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at 24.
151. Id. at 26.
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B. The Case Law
1 .The Downfall of the Death Penalty in the United States'52
The death penalty came to a halt when the Supreme Court decided
Furman v. Georgia in 1972.53 The longest written opinion in the his-
tory of the Supreme Court narrowly held that the death penalty laws
were unconstitutional in many states because they violated the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution. The Eighth Amendment prohibits
"cruel and unusual punishment" and is applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.'54 The Court ruled five to four in favor of
unconstitutionally. Two justices, Brennan and Marshall, found that the
death penalty was per se unconstitutional, while the others based their
opinions on the proposition that the sentence was randomly given,
creating disparity.
In the Furman decision, Texas and Georgia's statutes were exam-
ined.' 55 The Court held that the statutes were unconstitutional because
they were arbitrary and capricious, lacking the proper standards to
guide a sentence.'56 Justice Stewart of the majority stated that the
prisoners sentenced "were among a capriciously selected handful." '157
Justice White of the majority also found "no meaningful basis for
distinguishing" the prisoners who were to die from those who were
not.'58 When the Furman decision was finally handed down, it
stopped the deaths of over 600 prisoners then on states' death
rows. 159
The Court looked to the Eighth Amendment to decide that the
152. Since the death penalty has been a controversial topic in the United States for many
years, and many issues have arisen from the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, this
paper will consider the cases dealing directly with the punishment itself.
153. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
154. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII & XIV; see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at
214.
155. See Stephen R. Mcallister, The Problem of Interpreting a Constitutional System of
Capital Punishment, 43 K. L. REV. 1039 (1995). The reason that the Texas and Georgia stat-
utes were examined was because the cases that went up to the Supreme Court were from those
states. The Georgia statute provided that the punishment for murder would be death, but could
be for life instead if "(1) the jury returned a 'recommination of mercy' or (2) the conviction
rested 'solely on circumstantial testimony'." Id. at 1049. Under the first situation, the trial
judge was required to sentence the accused to life imprisonment over death. In the second
situation, the judge could discretionally choose life or death. Id.
The Texas statute in question provided that the punishment for murder was death or life
imprisonment or for any term of imprisonment not less than two years. Id. The jury was to
make the call with seemingly no guidance.
156. Id. at 1040. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at 214.
157. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
158. Id. (White, J., concurring). See also Mcallister, supra note 155, at 1080.
159. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at 14.
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death penalty was unconstitutional, but the grounds on which they held
it unconstitutional were procedural. The Court did not analyze the
substantive meaning that the punishment itself was "cruel and unusu-
al." Therefore, to make the death penalty constitutional, states needed
only to make the procedure for imposing the death penalty constitution-
al.
2. The Aftermath
After the Furman decision was handed down, many state legisla-
tures quickly rewrote their death penalty laws. The "veritable stampede
of state reenactment of the death penalty" on the coattails of Furman
proved with "unmistakable clarity that the issue is nothing less than the
right of the people to govern themselves. "'6 In fact, thirty-five states
enacted new statutes after the decision. Many states enacted statutes
that took the discretion out of the juror's hands by making the death
penalty mandatory for certain crimes.
C. The Reinstatement of the Death Penalty
The Supreme Court was faced with new cases after the numerous
statutes that were created in order to abide by the Furman decision.' 6 '
In Gregg v. Georgia,62 and its companion cases of Proffit v. Flori-
da63 and Jurek v. Texas," 4 the Supreme Court held seven to two
that the statutes used to advise and guide jurors made sentencing pris-
oners with the death penalty constitutional once again. 65 The statutes
allowed the jurors to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstanc-
es. Also, the statutes provided that a death penalty sentence will be
considered separately after the determination of guilt or innocence."
The statutes further provided for an automatic appeal to the highest
state court. The steps enumerated in these statutes are known as "guid-
ed discretion. 167
The Court also had to consider the statutes that made the death
penalty mandatory. In Woodson v. North Carolina'68 and Roberts v.
160. Furman, 408 U.S. 238. See also RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, THE SUPREME
COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 1, 8 (1982).
161. Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
162. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
163. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
164. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
165. See Mcallister, supra note 155, at 1040; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at
15, 215.
166. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 120, at 15.
167. See Mcallister, supra note 155, at 1040.
168. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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Louisiana,169 the Court invalidated mandatory sentencing. This creat-
ed the concept of "individualized sentencing. '"170 The Court, relying
on the Eighth Amendment held that: (1) the mandatory sentence was
inconsistent with contemporary ideas regarding punishment and were
considered "cruel and unusual"; (2) the sentence would only "mask the
problem" of guided discretion since jurors could beat the system by
finding the accused not guilty; and (3) aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances must be considered in each case."7
The decisions of the Court are conflicting. If the Court focuses on
guided discretion, "it upholds particular sentencing procedures and the
State prevails."'7I In contrast, when the Court considers individual-
ized sentencing, the "capital defendants generally prevail."' 73 In a
recent case, Graham v. Collins,"4 Justice Thomas tried to untangle
the Court's new death penalty web. He stated that:
We need only conclude that it is consistent with the Eighth Amendment for
the States to channel the sentence's consideration of a defendant's arguably
mitigating evidence so as to limit the relevance of that evidence in any rea-
sonable manner, so long as the State does not deny the defendant a full and
fair opportunity to appraise the sentence of all constitutionally relevant cir-
cumstances. 75
Justice Thomas emphasized that the federal courts could use the rea-
sonableness standard in reviewing what the state chose as guides to a
sentence. 176
In another recent decision, Callins v. Collins, "7 Justice
Blackmun acknowledged the "tension" between the death penalty
decisions.' 8 He stated that "[t]he problem is that the inevitability of
factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants."' 79 Justice Thomas stated that "a step
towards consistency is a step away from fairness. '"'og He concluded
by stating that the day would come when the Supreme Court would
abandon the death penalty altogether."'
169. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
170. See Mcallister, supra note 155, at 1040.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1064.
173. Id.
174. 506 U.S. 461 (1993).
175. Id. at 478 (Thomas, J., concurring).
176. See Mcallister, supra note 155, at 1075; see also Graham, 506 U.S. at 914-15.
177. _ U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 1127 (1994).
178. Id. at 1128 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
179. Id. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
180. Id. at 1132.
181. Id. at 1138.
1996]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PATHS OF THE PENALTY IN BOTH
COUNTRIES
In deciding the death penalty issue, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa and the U.S. Supreme Court compared some of the same
elements, but some elements differed. First, the Courts both examined
the importance of disparity through the arbitrary and capricious appli-
cation of the death penalty, but they applied the element differently.
The South African courts were required to examine mitigating circum-
stances, which contained personal and subjective factors. 8 2 The Unit-
ed States courts, through recent decisions by the Supreme Court, must
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances when applying the
death penalty.' 3
The Constitutional Court noted that "little difference" existed
between the guided discretion concept of the United States and their
appellate division's imposition of sentences in South Africa.' 4 The
South African court stated that it believed educated and experienced
judges would be able to apply the death penalty more consistently than
jurors who were given only statutory guidance.'85 Then, the Constitu-
tional Court took the argument further than the U.S. Supreme Court by
looking at the actual "element of chance" that existed in the implemen-
tation of the death penalty. Amazingly, the Court decided that the death
penalty is arbitarily used through an approach mentioned by a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice: "[a]ny law nondiscriminatory on its face may
be applied in such a way as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' 86 Through the words of U.S. Justices,
the South African Constitutional Court held the death penalty unconsti-
tutional in South Africa.
Although the Constitutions of both countries are similar in many
ways, they also differ. The South African Constitution contains the
"limitation clause," which allows the Constitutional Court to decide
after a fundamental had been identified, whether the decision of the
State to impede on a right was justified.
The U.S. Constitution does not have such a clause. As a result,
the U.S. Supreme Court Justices were forced to decide limits of consti-
tutional rights by narrowly interpreting the rights.'87 The South Afri-
182, State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Const. Ct. Republic S. Afr. 1995) (Internet,
http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.htrn).
183. See discussion supra section III(B).
184. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html).
185. Id.




can court even notes that the U.S. Supreme Court is struggling to
"eliminate the dangers of arbitrariness" by having to employ the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments provisions of due process.' The South
African court acknowledged that the constitution does not require con-
sideration of the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, which the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court had to consider. The South African
justices needed only examine the right to life itself.8 9
The Courts did agree on some of the same elements in their deci-
sions. For instance, both Courts agree that public opinion cannot be al-
lowed to "divert" the justices from acting as "independent arbiters" of
their Constitutions. 90 The South African court even cites the U.S.
Supreme Court in Furman, which stated that "[tihe assessment of
popular opinion is essentially a legislative, and not a judicial func-
tion. "'9'
Also, both Courts acknowledged, through their respective constitu-
tions that the right to dignity exists. However, the South African coun-
terpart to the United States Eighth Amendment is different. Section
11(2) prohibits "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment."'" The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.""'' 9 The United States Supreme Court read the concept of
dignity into the Eighth Amendment in Gregg v. Georgia.' Justice
Brennan stated that "the punishment of death treats members of the
human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discard-
ed."' The South African Constitution implicitly states that the right
to dignity will be a right every citizen of South Africa will hold.
The difference in the background of the Constitutions is noted by
the South African Supreme Court, and is important to discuss. The
South African Constitution was written after the country experienced
events that the United States experienced only after its Constitution was
written. The United States Constitution was written to be used as a
legal instrument to accommodate the needs of the citizens in the fu-
ture.'96 The South African Constitution, on the other hand, was writ-
ten only to retain the defenses to protect the country from the racist
188. Id. (Akerman, J., concurring).
189. See Makwanyane & Mchunu (Internet, http://pc72.law.wits.ac.za/index.html)
190. Id.
191. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 443 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
192. REPUBLIC OF S. AFRICA CONST. § 11 (2).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
194. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
195. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 230 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. See State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu (Const. Ct. Republic S. Aft. 1995) (Internet,
http://pc72.1aw.wits.ac.za/index.html) (Mohamed, J., concurring).
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and troubled background from which it has suffered.'97
Seeing that similarities and differences exist, what is the path of
the death penalty for both countries? The United States Supreme Court
could look toward the opinion of the Constitutional Court in abolishing
the death penalty. The Supreme Court has already tried to analyze the
death penalty by narrowing the crimes to which it can be applied, the
circumstances surrounding the crimes, and the manner in which the
jury is instructed. However, problems still exist.
The original problem lies in how the Court has decided to analyze
the application of the penalty. Instead of deciding whether it is cruel or
unusual, the Court has tried to fix the way the penalty is procedurally
applied. The next step for the Court could be to examine the death pen-
alty under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution deciding if it is
cruel and unusual, just like in South Africa.
The United States could move toward the South African decision
of abolition, while South Africa could be headed towards the United
States' decision of narrowly applying the death penalty. South Africa
went from having the death penalty that was applied in enormous num-
bers to the extreme of abolishing it altogether. If the Assembly rein-
states the death penalty, the court might have to rule on the issue
again. In that case, members of the Assembly may decide to follow
some of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, allowing for the death
penalty, but under more stringent circumstances.
In conclusion, both countries tried to examine a penalty that was
applied throughout much of each country's history, and make a deci-
sion about its future. The death penalty issue in both countries appears
to be circular. The next step for the United States could be to end the
confusion and turmoil by, as Justice Blackmun predicted, abolishing it
altogether. If that is so, the United States could be looking to the opin-
ion of the Constitutional Court of South Africa for guidance. On the
other side, the South African Court has not heard the last of the death
penalty. Deputy President De Klerk has already vowed to contest the
decision ending the death penalty and to move for a constitutional
amendment. Where will South Africa's debate regarding the death
penalty lead the country? Clearly the paths of the death penalty in both
countries show us that it is entirely possible for sentiment regarding the
death penalty to change. Anything is possible.
Dana L. Bogie
197. Id.
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